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FLORIDA DEFAMATION LAW AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: PROTECTING THE REPUTATIONAL
INTERESTS OF THE PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL
JOSEPH KENT BROWN
The role of the private individual1 in the law of defamation2 has
historically been a subject of extensive judicial concern and schol-
arly debate.' Today all states have defamation laws which provide
redress to private individuals whose reputational interests have
been damaged by defamatory publications. Essentially, these laws
seek to balance two strong and often competing values: the free-
dom of speech and press4 and the reputational interests of the pri-
1. As defined by the courts, a "private individual" is one who cannot be categorized as
either a "public official" or a "public figure." See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 343-44 (1974). The term "public official" has been defined to apply to "those among the
hierachy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). See Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (city police officer) reh'g denied
401 U.S. 1015 (1971); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (deputy sheriff); Rosen-
blatt, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (former supervisor of municipal ski resort); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (elected city commissioner). The term "public figure" has been
defined to include those who "have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society," or who occupy "positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are
deemed public figures for all purposes," Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, or those who voluntarily
inject their "personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy." Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (former college football coach was held to be a
public figure); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (prominent
real estate developer); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (retired army general
turned political activist who led a group of demonstrators in a racial disturbance). It is clear,
however, that the media cannot create a "public figure" by virtue of its coverage of an indi-
vidual and then claim the defense of lack of actual malice. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
111, 134-35 (1979). See infra text accompanying notes 119 & 121 for a discussion of the
application of the actual malice requirement for public officials and public figures.
2. Defamation, including both libel and slander, is defined by the Florida courts as "the
unprivileged publication of false statements which naturally and proximately result in in-
jury to another." Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
3. See generally Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tx. L. Rav. 422 (1975);
Eaton, The American Law Of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. And Be-
yond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Eaton]; Rob-
ertson; Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54
TEx. L. REv. 199 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Robertson]. See also Meiklejohn, Public
Speech and the First Amendment, 55 G.o. L. J. 234 (1966); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press
and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1964).
4. The freedoms of speech and press are among those rights guaranteed by the first
amendment. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. In accord with
the usage adopted by the United States Supreme Court, this comment does not distinguish
between the freedom of speech and press clauses of the first amendment. See Lange, The
Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 77 (1975). Some commentators have sug-
gested, however, that the two clauses are distinct and have individual meaning. See Nim-
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vate individual.8
Few rights are more central to the continued maintenance and
viability of a democratic society than the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of speech and press.' It cannot be too often repeated
that we are a nation committed to the principle that discussion on
matters of public significance should be uninhibited and robust.7 A
necessary concomitant to the advancement of this national philos-
ophy is the recognition of a press that is free and unrestrained by
censorship.'
Conscious of its virtue, however, a free press can often be abu-
sive of its rights.' The advent of increased technological and eco-
nomic developments in the field of mass communications has al-
lowed contemporary media the means to disseminate information
on a scale previously unobtainable.10 In its contest for mass audi-
mer, Introduction - Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom
of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Address by Mr. Justice Stewart, Yale Law School
Sequicentennial Convocation, November 2, 1974, reprinted in Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
5. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Justice Stewart has stated,
"Itihe right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and
wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of
every human being - a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). Moreover, the protection of an
individual's reputation represents important underlying social values:
The repute in which one is held among his fellow men has been proved by the
experience of the human race to be a most potent factor in determining his moral,
social, and even material well-being.. . . Accordingly no system of civil law can
fail to take some account of the right to have one's reputation remain untarnished
by defamation.
1 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 274 (1960).
6. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and press "was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). "The maintenance of the
opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity
essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional
system." Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
7. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964). (The Court emphasized
our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open.").
8. Thomas Jefferson, who presented some of the first modules of American thinking on
the subject of free speech and press, observed that, "[t]he only security of all is in a free
press," and that "[tihe force of public opinions cannot be resisted, when permitted freely to
be expressed." Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 1950).
9. THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A GEN-
ERAL REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION: NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES, MAGAZINES,
AND BOOKS. 1 (1947) [hereinafter cited as GENERAL REPORT.]
10. Id. at 30.
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ence, contemporary media's exercise of its awesome power to ex-
ploit and manipulate public opinion can result in devastating ef-
fects on the reputational interests of a private individual."
Although society must necessarily tolerate some abuse in ex-
change for the advantages arising out of an uncensored press, 1'2 the
first amendment was not intended to allow the press its own juris-
prudence.13 Of considerable importance in our society is the right
of an individual to protect his or her reputation from false, irre-
sponsible or malicious publications." Thus, the freedoms of speech
and press and the reputational interests of private individuals
often conflict.
The law of defamation has evolved in an attempt to balance
these two apparently irreconcilable interests. 8 Prior to 1964, com-
mon law defamation principles governed the standards of liability
to be established by plaintiffs in defamation actions.' 6 Absent the
affirmative defenses of truth1 7 or privilege,18 the publisher of de-
famatory statements was subjected to strict liability."e In 1964, the
United States Supreme Court recognized that these harsh common
law principles intruded into the zone of protected public speech
and were thus incompatible with the first amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech and press.2 In a series of cases originating with
11. Id. at vii. The term "media" is used to refer to newspapers, radio, television, motion
pictures, magazines and other forms of mass communications. Id. at v.
12. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1967).
13. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 402-403 (White J. dissenting.) See also GENERAL REPORT supra
note 9, at 130, 81. "Accountability, like subjection to law, is not necessarily a net subtraction
to liberty. . . .The First Amendment was intended to guarantee free expression, not to
create a privileged industry."
14. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 403.
15. Id. at 345.
16. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 738 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
17. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Fraser, 209 F.2d 1, 7 (5th Cir. 1954) (questions of truth and
good motives as a defense to a libel action are for the jury); Florida Publishing Co. v. Lee, 80
So. 245 (Fla. 1918) (truth coupled with good motives is a complete defense in a civil action
for libel); Applestein v. Knight Newspapers, Inc., 337 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (pub-
lisher of defamatory statements entitled to summary judgment where no genuine issue of
material fact existed as to the truth of the statement).
The Florida Constitution provides that "[iun all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for
defamation the truth may be given in evidence. If the matter charged as defamatory is true
and was published with good motives, the party shall be acquitted or exonerated." FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 4 (1968). This comment, however, will not address criminal defamation
actions.
18. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
19. See PROSSER, supra note 16, § 113, at 773.
20. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (the common law rule
"[dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First
1983]
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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court displaced common
law defamation principles adhered to by the various states and es-
tablished the existing federal constitutional standards for plaintiffs
in defamation actions.22 Plaintiffs who are judicially characterized
as "public officials '2 3 are required to prove, in order to recover
damages, that the defamatory statement was published with "ac-
tual malice," that is, with knowledge that the statement was false
or "with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 2 4 This
rule was later extended to apply to "public figures. 25 Although the
"actual malice" requirement of New York Times was briefly refor-
mulated to apply without consideration of the status of the plain-
tiff where the defamatory publication related to a matter of public
interest or general concern, 6 the Court soon repudiated this
27view.
The United States Supreme Court held in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,28 that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech and press requires a private plaintiff to establish that a de-
famatory statement was published with negligence in order to re-
cover compensatory damages in a defamation action.2 9 This less
and Fourteenth Amendments.")
21. Id.
22. 376 U.S. at 279.
23. Id. See supra note 1 for a definition of "public officials."
24. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86 (Mr. Justice Brennan stated that "actual mal-
ice" must be shown with "convincing clarity.") In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727
(1968), Justice White attempted to elaborate on the meaning of "reckless disregard." "There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id. at 731.
25. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See supra note 1 for a definition
of "public figures."
26. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (private individual libeled by
false and defamatory newscast relating to his involvement in an event of public or general
concern may be sustained only upon clear and convincing proof that the defamatory false-
hood was published with actual malice). See supra text accompanying notes 126-35.
27. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. The "extension of the New York Times test proposed by the
Rosenbloom plurality would abridge [the] legitimate state interest [of protecting the reputa-
tional interests of a private individual] to a degree that we find unacceptable." Id.
28. 418 U.S. 323.
29. Id. at 347-50. Although the Court defined the lesser standard to be established by
private plaintiffs in terms of "fault," Blackmun in his concurring opinion assumed that the
standard was one of negligence. Id. at 353-54. The negligence standard established by Gertz
for private individuals is limited to the recovery of compensatory damages for "actual in-
jury." Id. at 349. Private plaintiffs seeking presumed and punitive damages must prove pub-
lication with "actual malice." Id. This holding abolished the common law concept of pre-
sumed damages for plaintiffs alleging defamation per se. See supra text accompanying note
60.
A question left unresolved by Gertz was whether the negligence standard extended to
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exacting standard for private individuals serves to accomodate so-
ciety's commitment to "free and robust" discussion on public is-
sues with the states' strong interest in protecting the reputational
interests of the private individual.30 Unlike public officials or pub-
lic figures, private individuals have less access to the means for ef-
fectively rebutting attacks on their reputation."1 Moreover, the
Gertz Court reasoned that private individuals do not voluntarily
expose themselves to media attention and were thus more deserv-
ing of protection.3 2 The Court nevertheless concluded that the
states were free to fashion for themselves a more stringent stan-
dard than minimum negligence for private individuals, provided
media defendants were not subjected to a standard of liability
without fault.33
non-media defendants. In Gertz, the Court used terms such as "newspaper" and "broad-
caster" to define the negligence standard, indicating that its holding applied solely to media
defendants. Commentators have suggested that the Gertz standard is limited to media de-
fendants. See Eaton, supra note 3, at 1417: "The rules fashioned in Gertz clearly were
meant to apply only in defamation suits against the press .... But ultimate expansion of
Gertz to provide equal standards for recovery against both media and non-media defen-
dants seems predictable." Id.; Robertson supra note 3, at 218 ("[l1imiting Gertz to media
defamation entails a functional preference for members of the press and broadcasting indus-
tries over other communicators"). Most states which have addressed the issue have ex-
tended the actual malice protection to non-media defendants when the defamed plaintiff is
a public official or public figure. Note, Mediaocracy and Mistrust: Extending New York
Times Defamation Protection to Nonmedia Defendants, 95 H~Av. L. Rav. 1876, 1878 n.12
(1982).
30. Gertz at 348. The Court stated that a negligence standard for private individuals
"recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals
for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors
of strict liability for defamation." Id.
31. Id. at 344. The Court recognized that the first available remedy to one whose reputa-
tion has been damaged by defamatory falsehoods is that of "self-help-using available op-
portunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse
impact on reputation." Id.
32. Id. at 344-45. The Court reasoned that public officials and figures, through their con-
scious efforts to involve themselves in public affairs, must necessarily accept the inevitable
concomitant of public criticism for their actions. The Court stated: "[Tihe communications
media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public figures have
voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood con-
cerning them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual." Id. at
345
33. Id. at 347. "We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id.
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia have expressly adopted as a matter of state
law the Gertz negligence standard for private plaintiffs in defamation actions. Eight states
have, like Florida, assumed without discussion that a private plaintiff must show that the
defamatory falsehood was published with negligence in order to recover damage in defama-
tion actions. These states have applied the Gertz negligence standard even if the defama-
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Almost a decade after the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz,
recent developments in Florida defamation law have focused on
the appropriate standard of liability to be established by private
plaintiffs in defamation actions, where the defamatory publication
relates to a matter of public interest or general concern. " Most
Florida courts have either held, or assumed without discussion,
that Florida law follows those standards articulated by the United
States Supreme Court under the first amendment, and require a
private individual to establish only that the defamatory falsehood
was published with negligence.3 5 This standard applies even if the
tory publication relates to a matter of public interest or general concern.
Only four states have adopted as a matter of state law the standard of "actual malice" for
private individuals where the publication relates to a matter of public interest or general
concern as set forth in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
In three cases, federal courts have construed relevant state law as having adopted the
Gertz negligence standard for private plaintiffs. Only one federal court has construed state
law as having adopted the Rosenbloom standard for private plaintiffs, choosing instead an
intermediate standard of gross negligence. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 423 So.
2d 376, 385 n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), for a complete citation of these decisions.
New York has refused to adopt either the Gertz or Rosenbloom standard for private
plaintiffs, choosing instead an intermediate standard of gross negligence. Chapadeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975) (private individuals must prove gross
negligence where the defamatory publication relates to a matter of public concern). See the
information compiled in Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376 at 385 n.3 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1982).
The negligence standard for private individuals has been adopted by the RSTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977), which provides:
Defamation of Private Person
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a private
person, or concerning a public official or public figure in relation to a purely pri-
vate matter not affecting his conduct, fitness or role in his public capacity, is sub-
ject to liability, if, but only if, he
(a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other,
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.
In addition, the Florida standard jury instructions require a negligence standard for pri-
vate plaintiffs in defamation actions. Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil cases § MI
4.3, at 1 (1978).
34. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376. The third district held in
accord with existing federal constitutional standards for plaintiffs in defamation actions and
the majority of jurisdictions, that private individuals need only establish that the defama-
tory falsehood was published with negligence. This rule applies even where the defamatory
publication relates to a matter of public interest or general concern. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 191-92. In Tribune Co. v. Levin, 7 FLA. L.W. 2549 (Fla. 2d DCA Dec. 10, 1982),
the second district held in accordance with Ane that under Florida defamation law a private
plaintiff whose reputation has been damaged by a defamatory newspaper article can recover
damages upon a showing of negligence.
35. See Karp v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 359 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), ap-
peal dismissed, 365 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1978). In this case both parties stipulated that the
standard to be applied to private individuals in defamation actions is the Gertz standard of
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publication relates to a matter of public interest or general con-
cern. 6 The Florida Supreme Court, however, has never explicitly
adopted that view.3 7
This comment will examine Florida defamation law and its at-
tempts to formulate a post-Gertz standard for private plaintiffs.
Part I will briefly examine relevant aspects of Florida's common
law defamation principles. The various defenses available to a me-
dia defendant at common law, including the conditional privilege
of "fair comment" on matters of public interest, will be discussed.
Part II will discuss the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court which assumed an essential role in the evolution of existing
federal constitutional standards for plaintiffs in defamation ac-
tions. Part III will outline the impact of these decisions on the law
of defamation in Florida, including recent Florida decisions which
have reaffirmed the principles and standards for private individu-
als articulated by the United States Supreme Court. Following an
examination of these recent Florida developments, this comment
will analyze the implications of adopting an actual malice standard
negligence. The third district relied on the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Firestone
v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), order on mandate, 332
So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1976), to apply the Gertz negligence standard. Although the United States
Supreme Court agreed that the Supreme Court of Florida had apparently adopted a negli-
gence standard in Firestone, the Court nevertheless reversed the Florida Supreme Court for
its failure to specifically delineate a standard of liability for private individuals in defama-
tion actions. 424 U.S. at 463-64. See also From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52,
55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), petition for review denied, 412 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1982); Helton v.
United Press Int'l, 303 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (private plaintiffs no longer
required under Gertz to prove actual malice to recover damages in defamation actions but
the court did not articulate what standard of liability must be established); Finkel v. Sun
Tattler Co., 348 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 135
(Fla. 1978) (recognizing that the standard of liability to be established by private individu-
als differs from that governing public figures but neglected to state what that standard was).
The From court emphasized that several post-Gertz Florida defamation decisions had ap-
parently adopted a negligence standard for private plaintiffs but stated "the Supreme Court
of our state has not had or taken the opportunity to adopt an actual malice or simple negli-
gence standard, and we restrain ourselves from doing so in this case." From, 400 So. 2d at
55.
36. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376; Tribune Co. v. Levin, 7 Fla.
L.W. 2549.
37. See Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1974), rev'd, 424 U.S. 448
(1976), order on mandate, 332 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1976). Although the Supreme Court appar-
ently adopted without discussion a negligence standard for private individuals through its
use of such language as "convincing evidence of. . . negligence" and "flagrant example of
journalistic negligence" to describe the degree of care exercised by the publisher of defama-
tory statements, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Supreme
Court of Florida for failing to delineate, at least, a negligence standard as established in
Gertz.
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for private individuals involved in matters of public interest or
general concern. This comment concludes that Florida defamation
law is consistent with the first amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech and press as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court. Florida law requires a private plaintiff to establish that a
defamatory statement was published with negligence, even if the
publication relates to a matter of public interest or general con-
cern. This conclusion is compelled by neither Florida common law
precedent nor Florida constitutional law, but rather, draws support
from the consistent adherence by the Florida courts to the defama-
tion decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Prior to New York Times and its progeny, there was no need for
defamation plaintiffs in Florida to prove any negligence or actual
malice on the part of a publisher of defamatory statements. It was
enough if a plaintiff established that the statement was defamatory
and that it referred to him. To alleviate the harshness of this sys-
tem, Florida courts recognized a conditional privilege to comment
on matters of public interest involving public figures. If the state-
ment was conditionally privileged, the burden of proof would shift
to the plaintiff to establish that the statement was published with
malice. This privilege was subsequently accorded constitutional
protection by the United States Supreme Court in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.3 8
To the extent that states such as Florida recognized a condi-
tional privilege of fair comment on matters of public interest or
general concern involving private plaintiffs, the United States Su-
preme Court in Gertz expressly disfavored this approach recogniz-
ing that individual reputational interests were inadequately pro-
tected. 9 Moreover, the determination of what constitutes a matter
of "public interest" creates uncertainty and confusion. Accord-
ingly, Florida courts have effectively removed this privilege by
adopting the negligence standard for private plaintiffs established
in Gertz; determining instead the degree of protection to be ac-
corded a media defendant by focusing on the character or status of
the plaintiff himself and not by examining the subject matter of
the publication. The negligence standard relieves a media defen-
dant from the rigors of strict liability, thus serving the original
purpose of the conditional privilege. Therefore, the latter has been
appropriately discarded in favor of the former.
38. 376 U.S. 254.
39. Gertz, 418 U.S. 346.
DEFAMATION LAW
Florida has long recognized a pervasive and strong interest in
protecting individual reputations. The negligence standard for pri-
vate individuals accommodates this legitimate interest and is suffi-
cient to ensure free and open discussion on public issues. A more
stringent standard for private individuals would inadequately serve
to protect the reputational interests of the private individual, cre-
ating an improper balance between reputational interests and the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and press. Such a
standard would impair to an appreciable extent the underlying
philosophy of and justification for the defamation action in the
context of modern society.
I. FLORIDA COMMON LAW DEFAMATION PRINCIPLES
Defamation, including both libel and slander, is defined by the
Florida courts "as the unprivileged publication of false statements
which naturally and proximately result in injury to another."' " The
law of defamation has evolved to serve a number of important pur-
poses.4 The primary purpose of defamation law is to compensate
those whose reputation has been attacked by false and malicious
publications.' 2 Historically, defamation actions were the province
of the local seignorial courts.' As the deterioration of these courts
became evident, the ecclesiastical courts assumed jurisdiction of
defamation actions, punishing the defamatory utterance as a sin."
40. Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). See the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977), which defines a defamatory communication in more narrow
terms: "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating
or dealing with him." The elements for a cause of action in defamation are set out below:
Elements Stated
To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher;
and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the exis-
tence of special harm caused by the publication.
Id. at § 558.
41. See Eaton supra note 3, at 1357-59. The author outlines a number of purposes
served by the law of defamation. Like all tort law, the primary purpose of defamation law is
to compensate for injury. Additionally, defamation law serves as a means for the plaintiff to
rebut and correct attacks made on his reputation. Moreover, the defamation action serves to
deter the publication of falsehoods, ensuring that only truthful information is disseminated.
42. Id. at 1357.
43. PROSSER supra note 16. § 111, at 737-38. See generally; Veeder, History and Theory
of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLuM. L. R-v. 546 (1903.)
44. See PROssER, supra, note 16, § 111, at 737-38.
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When the power of the ecclesiastical courts subsequently dissi-
pated, the common law courts gradually assumed control of defa-
mation actions."'
Judicial attitudes expressed in Florida's early defamation deci-
sions reflect a jealous guardianship of the reputational interests of
the private individual."' The right of an individual to protect his
reputation from malicious publications was considered a sacrosanct
concept and any attempt to impugn one's personal reputation was
looked upon with extreme disfavor.17 In Hayes v. Todd,48 the Su-
preme Court of Florida considered the following language from
jury instructions issued by a circuit judge in a libel case:
Exemplary damages are such as not only compensate the wrong
done, but also tend to protect all good citizens of the state from
like wrongs from the reckless and malicious tongue of such law-
less persons as have no regard for the good name of their fellows,
or for the fair name and virtue of the women of the land, but turn
themselves loose, like ravenous wolves, to destroy that which
money cannot buy, and that which, when lost, the power of earth
cannot restore. 9
Although the Florida Supreme Court viewed the language utilized
by the circuit judge as "somewhat intemperate," the court found
that no prejudice had resulted to the defendant.50
At common law, plaintiffs in defamation actions alleging either
libel or slander were required to prove only that the publication
was defamatory and that the publication referred to the plaintiff.6 1
Absent the affirmative defenses of truth or privilege, the publisher
of defamatory statements was subjected to strict liability.2 Libel
was defined by the Florida courts as a malicious publication in any
written or visual form, "which exposes a person to distrust, hatred,
contempt, ridicule, or obloguy, or which causes such person to be
45. Id.
46. Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234 (Fla. 1933); Commander v. Pedersen, 156 So. 337
(Fla. 1934).
47. See supra note 46.
48. 15 So. 752 (Fla. 1894).
49. Id. at 755.
50. Id.
51. Briggs v. Brown, 46 So. 325, 330 (Fla. 1908).
52. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 578 (1938); PROSSER, supra note 16, § 113, at 773. For
a complete discussion of the defenses available under Florida's common law defamation
principles, see Rahdert & Snyder, Rediscovering Florida's Common Law Defenses to Libel
and Slander, 11 STET. L. REv. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Defenses].
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avoided, or which has a tendency to injure such person in his of-
fice, occupation, business or employment." 3
Florida courts also distinguished between two types of libel: libel
per se and libel per. quod.5 4 The two differed basically in the plain-
tiff's burden of proving injury resulting from the defamatory publi-
cation. 5 A plaintiff alleging libel per se did not have to establish
either actual malice or negligence on behalf of the publisher." A
negligence standard was unavailable at common law57 and malice
in cases alleging libel per se was presumed as a matter of law. 8
Moreover, plaintiffs alleging libel per se did not have to plead or
prove damages resulting from the defamatory publication." Dam-
ages to the plaintiff were necessarily imputed because a publica-
tion constituting libel per se was injurious to an individual's pro-
fessional, official or personal relations on its face without
consideration of extrinsic facts or innuendo. 0
A defamatory statement constituting libel per quod, however,
had to be accompanied by an allegation and subsequent proof of
damages.61 The defamatory nature of words and statements action-
able per quod was not apparent on the face of the publication,
rather the publication had the effect of injuring the plaintiff.6 2 In
order to determine this damaging effect, Florida courts considered
53. Briggs, 46 So. at 330.
54. Layne, 146 So. at 236.
55. Id.
56. Florida recognized five categories of statements which were defamatory per se. These
included statements imputing to plaintiff the commission of a crime; a veneral disease or
other loathsome or communicable disease; conduct incompatible with plaintiffs trade, busi-
ness or office or accusing a woman of unchastity. Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66
So. 2d 495, 497 (Fla. 1953). The fifth category included statements which subject a plaintiff
to public hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace. Briggs, 46 So. 325. This category
applied to both libel and slander. Joopanenko v. Gavagan, 67 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1953); Sharp
v. Bussey, 187 So. 779 (Fla. 1939). To determine whether the language of the publication
was actionable per se, the court would construe the language as the "common mind" would.
Loeb v Geronemus, 66 So. 2d 241, 245 (Fla. 1953).
57. See Hallen, The Character of Belief Necessary for the Conditional Privilege in Def-
amation, 25 Nw. U.L. REv. 865 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Halleni.
58. Commander v. Pedersen, 156 So. at 339.
59. Id.
60. Layne, 146 So. 234. The rule of presumed damages has been abolished by the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Gertz. 418 U.S. at 349. Thus, the distinction between
libel per se and libel per quod is of historical relevance only. "Since pleading and proof of
actual injury are required in most cases per Gertz, all libels governed by Gertz are, in effect,
libel per quod." From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52, 57 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
61. Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1953); Tip Top Grocery
Co. v. Wellner, 186 So. 219 (Fla. 1938); Commander v. Pedersen, 156 So. 337 (Fla. 1937).
62. See supra note 61.
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the circumstances and conditions surrounding the publication, in-
cluding the local opinions of those in the vicinity.63 The Florida
courts, however, viewed the pernicious quality of both an action in
libel per se and per quod as embodied in the fact that "they are
the natural and proximate causes of pecuniary damage to those
concerning whom such words are maliciously [uttered]. ' '"4
In an attempt to mitigate the harsh results that sometimes ac-
crued to the media defendant at common law, Florida courts rec-
ognized several defenses to the strict liability standard. Available
to the defendant at common law were the affirmative defenses of
truth and privilege. 6
A privileged publication was defined by the Florida courts as a
statement or communication which would otherwise be defamatory
and actionable except if "the defendant is acting in furtherance of
some interest of social importance, which is entitled to protection
even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff's repu-
tation."66 The privilege defense was subdivided into two distinct
classifications: absolute privilege and conditional privilege. 7 Of the
numerous privileges available to a defendant at common law, the
most important for purposes of constitutional analysis, was the
conditional privilege of "fair comment" on matters of public
interest.68
The conditional privilege of "fair comment" was developed in re-
sponse to judicial recognition that in some circumstances societal
interests were ill served by a harsh strict liability standard.6 ' The
63. Layne, 146 So. at 236.
64. Id.
65. See infra note 67.
66. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 114, at 776. See also Briggs, 46 So. 325; Abraham v. Bald-
win, 42 So. 591 (Fla. 1906).
67. An absolute privilege granted the publisher of defamatory falsehoods absolute immu-
nity from liability in defamation actions. The privilege extended to legislative and judicial
proceedings. State v. Tillet, 111 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959); Coogler v. Rhodes, 21 So.
109 (Fla. 1897). The privilege was not defeated by showing that the defamatory statement
was published with malice. Coogler, 21 So. 109. The privilege was limited, however, to apply
only to statements which were relevant to the proceedings. An irrelevant statement would
only be conditionally privileged. Taylor v. Alropa Corp., 189 So. 230 (Fla. 1939).
68. The privilege required a showing of malice to sustain an action for defamation for
comment concerning "public officials, political candidates, community leaders from the pri-
vate sector or private enterprises which affect public welfare, persons taking a public posi-
tion on a matter of public concern, and those who offer their creations for public approval
such as artists, performers, and athletes." 1 A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 11 108-40
(1969). See also M. NEWELL, THE LAW OF SLANDER AND LmEL IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES
§§ 487-504 (4th ed. 1924)
69. See supra note 67.
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application of conditional privilege to a defamatory publication re-
lating to a matter of public interest or concern, would under cer-
tain conditions, relieve from strict liability the defendant who was
without the benefit of a negligence standard at common law.7 0 De-
termining the parameters of conditional privilege, however, was
not a simple task. In Jones, Varnum & Co. v. Townsend's Admin-
istratrix,7 the Supreme Court of Florida first defined the scope of
a conditional privilege. A publication would be privileged and thus
not presumed malicious if:
fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private
duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs,
in matters where his interest is concerned, . . . [or] [i]f fairly war-
ranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly
made, such communications are protected for the common conve-
nience and welfare of society; and the law has not restricted the
right to make them within any [named] limits.72
Phrased somewhat differently, a conditional privilege of "fair com-
ment" was said to apply "[wihere a person is so situated that it
becomes right, in the interests of society, that he should tell to a
third person certain facts, then, if he bona fide, and without mal-
ice, does tell them, it is a privileged communication. '73 Conditional
privilege was therefore an affirmative defense.7 4 The application of
the doctrine to an otherwise defamatory falsehood would shift the
burden of proof to the plaintiff to show that the defamatory state-
ment was published with malice.7 Malice, which was referred to as
"express malice" or "actual malice" by the Florida courts, was de-
fined as "ill will, hostility, [or] evil intention to defame and in-
jure. '7 6 If the plaintiff could establish actual malice on behalf of
the publisher, the conditional privilege of fair comment was lost.
7 7
70. See Hallen supra note 57, at 874.
71. 21 Fla. 431 (1885).
72. Id. at 456 (quoting Toogood v. Spyring, 149 Eng. Rep. 1044 (Ex. 1834) (bracketed
language in quotation attributable to the Florida Supreme Court).
73. Coogler, 21 So. at 112. See also Arnold v. Chase, 114 So. 856 (Fla. 1927). In reversing
a criminal conviction entered against a newspaper for the publication of a defamatory arti-
cle relating to a candidate for city commissioner, the Arnold court stated that "[i]t is a well-
settled rule that communications relating to the public welfare, if made in good faith, are
privileged." 114 So. at 857.
74. Coogler, 21 So. at 112.
75. Id.
76. Montgomery v. Knox, 3 So. 211, 217 (Fla. 1887).
77. Loeb v. Geronemus, 66 So. 2d 241, 244 (Fla. 1953).
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In White v. Fletcher,8 the Supreme Court of Florida recognized
a conditional privilege of fair comment to criticize the conduct and
qualifications of" 'public officials' or 'public men.' ",7' White, a po-
lice officer for the City of Orlando, received extensive public atten-
tion as a result of his alleged involvement with a prostitute. A
newspaper article which discussed the incident contained a state-
ment issued by the chairman of the civil service board that White
was "not fit to be a police officer."8 White sued the board chair-
man for libel. The court held that as a policeman, White was a
public officer and thus subject to fair comment.8 1 The court stated
that "one who seeks public employment or public office . . . sub-
mits his private character to the scrutiny of those whose patronage
he implores. '82
Similarly, in Abram v. Odham,8 the Supreme Court of Florida
applied the conditional privilege of fair comment to defamatory
statements made about one who had "injected himself" into a mat-
ter of great political interests. 4 In Abram, a candidate in the 1954
gubernatorial election campaign responded to certain derogatory
statements concerning his candidacy contained in an election pol-
ling survey, by calling the pollster, and the poll itself, "a phony."85
In holding that the candidate's statements were conditionally priv-
ileged the court essentially determined that the pollster had be-
come a public figure and thus subject to fair comment, by injecting
himself into the center of an important public event.86
These cases appear to have anticipated the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan87
where the Court constitutionalized the privilege to comment on
public persons. In fact, the Supreme Court of Florida later relied
on Abram and the New York Times decision to recognize a condi-
tional privilege for fair comment on a matter of public interest in-
volving a public figure.8 8 In Gibson v. Maloney, 9 the court held
78. 90 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1956).
79. Id. at 131.
80. Id. at 130.
81. Id. at 131.
82. Id. (quoting Kennett v. Barber, 31 So. 2d 44, 46 (Fla. 1947)). See also Crowell-Collier
Publishing Co. v, Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 1948) (court recognized a conditional
privilege to comment of matters of public interest involving the governor of Florida).
83. 89 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1956).
84. Id. at 336.
85. Id. at 335.
86. Id. at 336.
87. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
88. Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970) cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1973).
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that a publisher who adopted an editorial policy aimed at arousing
public indignation against certain business interests became a pub-
lic figure subject to fair comment."' Thus, the defendant's dispar-
aging remarks about the individual were conditionally privileged
under the doctrine of fair comment9 ' The Gibson court also relied
on its earlier decision in Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television
Co., 92 an invasion of privacy case, in which the court denied recov-
ery to a plaintiff who became an actor in a newsworthy event.'3
The Gibson court concluded that "under the command of the
Abrams, [sic] Jocova [sic] and Sullivan cases, the comment made
by Gibson was 'fair comment' on a public matter relating in part to
an individual who had by choice made himself newsworthy and a
part of the passing scene." '94
Some Florida commentators have argued that the Florida Su-
preme Court's reliance on Jacova established as a matter of state
law an actual malice standard for private individuals involved in
matters of public interest or general concern." This analysis ig-
nores the distinction between defamation and invasion of privacy
actions. The two differ in theory and are subject to separate legal
analysis.' 6 Moreover, this is essentially the same type of condi-
tional privilege which was expressly disfavored by the United
States Supreme Court in Gertz. Protection of individual reputa-
tional interests is inadequate and uncertainty and confusion is cre-
ated in determining exactly what is, and is not, a matter of "public
interest.' 7 Although Gertz left the states free to define their own
standard of liability for private individuals, 8 Florida courts, by
adopting the negligence standard, have effectively removed this
conditional privilege and Gibson has not been relied on by Florida
89. Id.
90. Id. at 824.
91. Id. at 826.
92. 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
93. Id. at 37.
94. 231 So. 2d at 826.
95. See Defenses, supra note 52, at 48. See also Comment, Defamation, The Private
Individual And Matters Of Public Concern: A Proposed Resolution For Florida, 32 U. FLA.
L. REV. 545 (1980).
96. Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 38 (Fla. 1955). See also
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376, 385 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
97. 418 U.S. at 351-52 (repudiating the "actual malice" standard for private individuals
involved in matters of public interest or general concern as announced in Rosenbloom). See
infra text accompanying notes 146-47.
98. Id. at 347.
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courts in the post-Gertz development of Florida defamation law. 9
The privilege of fair comment was further limited in its applica-
tion only to opinions based on true facts, and not to misstatements
of fact.'00 In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Brautigan, the Third
District Court of Appeal held in accordance with the majority of
jurisdictions that "no comment can be fair if it is based on mis-
statements of fact."''
The predominant theme surfacing throughout early Florida def-
amation decisions was the recognition of a private individual's
right to protect his reputation from defamatory publication. Al-
though the court recognized the central role of a free and vigorous
press in society,'02 the reputational interests of the private individ-
ual were considered paramount.
At common law, a private individual seeking redress for injury to
reputational interests did not have to establish either actual malice
or negligence on behalf of a publisher of defamatory falsehoods. 03
Although the harsh strict liability standard was tempered by the
recognition of privileges, the common law approach ultimately had
the effect of censorship on public speech which would otherwise be
99. Only one Florida appellate court has relied on Gibson in a libel action. In Bishop v.
Wometco Enters., 235 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970), the court stated that whether a
plaintiff was a public official, public figure or involved in a matter of public interest, the
New York Times rule of actual malice applied. On appeal to the district court after a re-
mand for a new trial, the Gibson decision was reversed on the basis of Rosenbloom. Gibson
v. Maloney, 263 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 268 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973).
100. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Brautigam, 127 So. 2d 718, 723 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert.
denied, 135 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 821 (1962).
101. Id. "Under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1975).
102. Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 238-39 (Fla. 1933). A republication privilege was
established to relieve a newspaper from liability for publishing a false and defamatory news
dispatch. The Layne decision has not been treated favorably by other jurisdictions. See
PROSSER, supra note 16, § 113, at 775.
Additional protection was accorded to the publishing press in the form of civil and crimi-
nal defamation statutes which prescribed written notice to a publisher or broadcaster of
defamatory statements in a newspaper or periodical, as a condition precedent to bringing
suit for defamation. Ch. 16070, §§ 1, 2, 1933 Fla. Laws 427 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§
770.01-.02, 836.07-.08 (1981)). If the defamatory falsehood was determined to have been
published in good faith and a correction, apology or retraction was published subsequent to
notice, the plaintiff was limited to recovery of actual damages in a civil action and any
criminal action was barred. Id. See Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950) (upholding the
constitutionality of the civil statutes).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
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protected.0 4 In 1964, the United States Supreme Court in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, addressed for the first time the com-
patibility of state defamation laws with the first amendment guar-
antee of freedom of speech and press. 05
II. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan AND ITS PROGENY
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, was the first in a series of Su-
preme Court decisions which substantially altered common law
defamation principles and established the existing federal constitu-
tional standards for plaintiffs in defamation actions. New York
Times was a landmark decision; even had it stood alone, the deci-
sion would have signalled a revolution in Florida defamation law
and state defamation laws throughout the country.106
At issue in New York Times was whether state libel laws were
limited by the. constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and
press. L. B. Sullivan was a city commissioner of Montgomery, Ala-
bama, and the supervisor of the city police force. He sued the New
York Times and four black clergymen alleging that he had been
libeled by statements contained in a New York Times paid adver-
tisement entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices."' 0 7 The advertise-
ment was authored by the black clergymen and was aimed at solic-
iting moral and financial support for the civil rights movement.
The advertisement concededly contained a number of false state-
ments. 08 Among those false statements were several references to
official action taken by the Montgomery City police force in con-
nection with dispersing student demonstrators. Although the ad-
vertisement did not refer to Sullivan by name, Sullivan claimed
that the references to "police" could naturally be imputed to him
personally as the supervisor of the city police department. 09 The
New York Times admittedly made no attempt to verify the accu-
racy of the advertisement." 0
The trial court instructed the jury that the statements contained
in the New York Times advertisement were "libelous per se" and
104. See supra note 20.
105. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
106. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 118, at 819. See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Ane, 423 So. 2d 376, 383. (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
107. 376 U.S. at 256.
108. Id. at 258.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 260-61. The Times stated that it did not attempt to verify the accuracy of the
advertisement because it was authored by several well known individuals and because noth-
ing in the advertisement indicated that it might contain false information.
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that under Alabama common law defamation principles, falsity
and malice were presumed."' The jury, finding that the statements
contained in the advertisement were made "of and concerning"
Sullivan, awarded Sullivan damages of $500,000.1" The Supreme
Court of Alabama affirmed and the New York Times appealed. 1"
The United States Supreme Court considered the case "against
the background of a profound national commitment to the princi-
ple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open."1"4 The Court "refused to recognize an exception for
any test of truth. . . especially one that puts the burden of prov-
ing truth on the speaker."1 5 Justice Brennan, writing for six mem-
bers of the Court, declared that common law defamation principles
which subjected a media defendant to strict liability for a defama-
tory publication were incompatible with the first amendment."1 6
The Court emphasized that the first amendment guarantee of free-
dom of speech and press "does not turn upon the 'truth, popular-
ity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered,' "1
and that the false statement, inevitable in discussion on public is-
sues or of public officials, "must be protected if the freedoms of
expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need. .. to
survive.' " The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
and press thus requires:
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering dam-
ages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct un-
less he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'
- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disre-
gard of whether it was false or not.""
The Court found that "actual malice" was lacking on behalf of
both the New York Times and the individual clergymen and, thus,
reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama. 20
The "actual malice" requirement of New York Times was ex-
111. Id. at 262.
112. Id. at 256.
113. Id. at 263-64.
114. Id. at 270.
115. Id. at 271.
116. Id. at 278-79.
117. Id. at 271 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).
118. Id. at 271-72 (quoting in part, Button 371 U.S. at 433).
119. Id. at 279-80.
120. Id. at 285-86, 292.
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tended three years later to apply to public figures. 2 In Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, and a companion case, Associated Press v.
Walker,112  Chief Justice Warren, joined by five members of the
Court, held that public figures must prove actual malice to recover
damages in defamation actions. 1 2  The Court stated that public
figures are those who have "attained that status by position alone"
or those whose "purposeful activity amount[s] to a thrusting of
[their] personalit[ies] into the 'vortex' of an important public con-
troversy. "124 In both cases, the court concluded, public figures
"commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had suffi-
cient access to the means of counter-argument to be able to 'ex-
pose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies' of the defama-
tory statements.' 125
The first opportunity for the Court to address the applicability
of the New York Times rule to private individuals resulted in no
majority opinion.1 26 In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., Justice
Brennan, writing for the plurality, suggested that a private individ-
ual who is injured by a defamatory publication which relates to a
121. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See supra note 1 for a defini-
tion of "public figures."
122. Butts, 388 U.S. 130.
123. Id. at 162, 164. The rationale for extending the "actual malice" requirement of New
York Times to public figures was expressed by Chief Justice Warren in his concurring
opinion:
In many situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled
through formal political institutions are now originated and implemented through
a complex array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associa-
tions, some only loosely connected with the Government. This blending of posi-
tions and power has also occurred in the case of individuals so that many who do
not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless intimately involved in the
resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events
in areas of concern to society at large.
Viewed in this context, then, it is plain that although they are not subject to the
restraints of a political process, 'public figures,' like 'public officials,' often play an
influential role in ordering society. And surely as a class these 'public figures' have
as ready access as 'public officials' to mass media of communication, both to influ-
ence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities. Our citizenry has
a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such persons, and freedom
of the press to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public
issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials'.
Id. at 163-64.
124. Id. at 155.
125. Id. (quoting in part Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)). In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren also stressed the necessity of
"balanc[ing] to a proper degree the legitimate interests traditionally protected by the law of
defamation against the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and press." 388 U.S.
at 164.
126. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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matter of public interest or general concern, must prove actual
malice to recover damages. 27 In Rosenbloom, a radio station
broadcast reports that George Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist
magazines, was arrested and charged with the possession of ob-
scene literature. Rosenbloom alleged that the radio station's char-
acterization of the magazines seized in his possession as "obscene"
constituted "libel per se" under state defamation law. 28 In addi-
tion, Rosenbloom claimed that the radio station's references to him
and his associates as "smut distributors" and "girlie-book ped-
dlers" were false and defamatory. 2 9 Subsequent to the radio sta-
tion broadcast, Rosenbloom was acquitted of the criminal obscen-
ity charges following a jury determination that the magazines he
distributed were not obscene.'
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals
which had applied the actual malice requirement of New York
Times to the case. In a five to three decision, the plurality sug-
gested that actual malice must be shown where a private individual
seeks to recover damages for a defamatory publication which re-
lates to a matter of public interest or general concern. 3' Justice
Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
emphasized that the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press does not apply solely where discussion on public issues
involves public officials or public figures. Rather, "[t]he public's
primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct
of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the
conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety."'3 2
Noticeably absent from the plurality's discussion was the previ-
ous approach utilized by the Court in balancing between the com-
peting values of state defamation laws and the first amendment.
Reputational interests of the private individual were not consid-
ered. Rather, the Court stated that "[i]f the States fear that pri-
vate citizens will not be able to respond adequately to publicity
involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring their
ability to respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of mat-
127. Id. at 32. The Court agreed with the court of appeals' application of the New York
Times actual malice standard to private individuals involved in matters of public interest or
concern.
128. Id. at 36.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 31-32.
132. Id. at 43.
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ters of public concern." '
Justice Black concurred separately stating that the first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom of speech and press protects a media
defendant from libel judgments even where a defamatory falsehood
was published with knowledge of its falsity.134 Justice White also
concurred but limited the application of New York Times to "re-
port and comment upon the official actions of public servants in
full detail, with no requirement that the reputation or the privacy
of an individual involved in or affected by the official action be
spared from public view.' 3 5 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Stewart, dissented. In his view the application of New York Times
to a private individual under any circumstances would give the
first amendment too broad a construction and would effectively
nullify the state's defamation laws which provide the private indi-
vidual with his only means for redress of defamatory falsehoods.
In 1974, the dissenting opinion in Rosenbloom became a major-
ity in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,136 where the Court returned to
the balancing approach utilized in its earlier defamation decisions.
Gertz, an attorney, was retained by the family of a youth killed by
a Chicago policeman to institute a civil action against the officer.
The American Opinion, an organ of the John Birch Society, pub-
lished an article entitled "Frame-Up: Richard Nuccio and the War
on Police" which accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "coin-
133. Id. at 47. In the plurality's view, the presumed dangers of press censorship that
would result from a negligence standard, caused "society's interest in protecting individual
reputation" to yield. Id. at 49. The Court stated: "In an ideal world, the responsibility of the
press would match the freedom and public trust given it. But from the earliest days of our
history, this free society, dependent as it is for its survival upon a vigorous free press, has
tolerated some abuse." Id. at 51.
One commentator observes that the "Rosenbloom test became a virtual carte blanche for
the media." Robertson, supra note 3, at 206. The author notes that following Rosenbloom,
"of over a hundred reported decisions dealing with the matter of public interest question,
only six clearly concluded that the media publication or broadcast in question did not qual-
ify." Id. The author refers to this as the 'bootstrap' effect of the Rosenbloom test" empha-
sizing that "[iun our society the media decide what is to be a matter of public or general
concern, and the courts have shown scant interest in second guessing that determination."
Id. See also Eaton, supra note 3, at 1402-03.
[Tihe news media, which had largely conditioned notions of what matters are of
public interest, was operating within a legal boundary which it had more or less
drawn for itself. 'Public interest' had become 'newsworthiness.' By erecting a con-
stitutional defense of ignorance for defamatory statements touching on some mat-
ter in the public interest, Rosenbloom had nearly destroyed the law of defamation.
Id.
134. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 57.
135. Id. at 62.
136. 418 U.S. 323.
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munist-fronter.' ' 37 The article further implied that Gertz had a
criminal record. 3 8
Gertz sued the publisher of the magazine alleging that the state-
ments were false. The district court, relying on the Supreme
Court's decision in Rosenbloom, held that the New York Times re-
quirement of actual malice applied regardless of the status of the
plaintiff and entered judgment against Gertz. 1 9 The court of ap-
peals affirmed.
The Supreme Court, with Justice Powell writing for the major-
ity, stated that the state's interest in protecting the reputations of
private individuals requires a rule other than that in New York
Times to determine the standard of liability to be established by
private individuals. 40 The Court emphasized that unlike public of-
ficials or public figures who have access to "the channels of effec-
tive communication''4 necessary to rebut and correct falsehoods
attacking their reputation, private individuals can seek redress
only through state defamation laws.1 41 Moreover, the Court
stressed that private individuals do not "invite attention and com-
ment" from the news media as do public officials and figures.' 43 As
a result, the Court determined that private individuals are more
deserving of protection.1 44
Noting that the Rosenbloom Court was "sadly fractionated,' ' 45
the Court stated that the application of the reformulation of the
New York Times rule announced in Rosenbloom to private indi-
viduals would effectively nullify the states' legitimate interest in
protecting the reputations of their citizens.' 46 Moreover, the Ro-
senbloom rule "would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing
state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publi-
cations address issues of 'general or public interest.'" The Court
noted its doubts concerning "the wisdom of committing this task
to the conscience of judges. ' '147
The Court held that even where "the substance of the defama-
137. Id. at 326.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 329.
140. Id. at 343.
141. Id. at 344.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 345.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 354.
146. Id. at 345-46.
147. Id. at 346.
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tory statement 'makes substantial danger apparent,' " the private
plaintiff must establish that the defamatory falsehood was pub-
lished with negligence.148 The Court emphasized that this approach
strikes a proper balance between society's interest in free and ro-
bust discussion on public issues and the state's strong interest in
protecting the reputational interests of the private individual.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that, "so long as they do not
impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves
the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster
of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.""149
III. THE IMPACT OF New York Times ON FLORIDA DEFAMATION
LAW
The impact of the New York Times line of decisions on Florida
defamation law was immediate. Florida courts consistently sought
to follow those standards articulated by the United States Su-
preme Court in determining the appropriate standard of liability
to be established for public officials, 5 ' public figures' and private
individuals. Following the Rosenbloom reformulation of the actual
malice requirement of New York Times, Florida courts determined
the appropriate standard for private individuals by focusing on the
subject matter of the defamatory publication. 5 In Nigro v. Miami
Herald Publishing Company, the Third District Court of Appeal
examined a newspaper article which referred to certain individuals
as "top members of the Mafia," and "Cosa Nostra men."' 53 The
named individuals sued for libel denouncing any involvement in
criminal activity and claiming that they were legitimate business-
men.' 5' The court applied the rule announced in Rosenbloom stat-
ing that crime, and more specifically, control of organized crime,
148. Id. at 347-48.
149. Id. at 347.
150. Coleman v. Collins, 384 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (city attorney characterized
as public official required to establish "actual malice" on the part of publisher of defama-
tory statements); Finkel v. Sun Tattler Co., 348 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (former city
attorney is a public official subject to "actual malice" standard); Palm Beach Newspapers v.
Early, 334 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (school superintendent is a public official and
therefore must prove publication with "actual malice" as prescribed in New York Time).
151. Lampkin-Asam v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 408 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). An
author who sought publicity for her research by presenting her book to a local newspaper is
a public figure and must prove actual malice to recover damages in defamation action.
152. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 748-49; Nigro v. Miami Herald Publishing
Co., 262 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 267 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1972).
153. Nigro, 262 So. 2d at 699.
154. Id.
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was a matter of public interest or general concern and thus private
plaintiffs seeking to recover damages in defamation actions must
show that the publication issued with malice. 1 5
When Rosenbloom was implicitly overruled by the United States
Supreme Court in Gertz, however, Florida courts discontinued
their adherence to Rosenbloom and applied a negligence standard
to private plaintiffs as established in Gertz. In Karp v. Miami Her-
ald Publishing Company,3 6 the Third District Court of Appeal
stated that the standard applicable to private plaintiffs in defama-
tion actions is negligence.' 51 There the court held that a newspa-
per, which had erroneously reported that the plaintiffs faced de-
portation hearings because they had entered the country illegally,
was not negligent because the reporter who had covered the story
received his information from a reliable source and had further
made reasonable efforts to verify the information.
Similarly, in Helton v. United Press International,"5 the First
District Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the trial court
which had applied the Rosenbloom standard to private plaintiffs.
The court noted that in Gertz the United States Supreme Court
receded from Rosenbloom and that "the doctrine of 'public or gen-
eral issue' is no longer available to the media as a defense in a
defamation suit by a citizen who is neither a public official nor a
public figure.' 59 The court held that under Florida defamation
law, which parallels the federal constitutional standards for plain-
tiffs in defamation actions, private plaintiffs "are no longer re-
quired to prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth as apparently was required by the progenitors of Gertz."'' 0
The Supreme Court of Florida has had the opportunity to ad-
dress the appropriate standard of liability to be established by pri-
vate plaintiffs in defamation actions only once in the post-New
York Times era.' 6 ' In Firestone v. Time, Inc.,62 the Supreme
Court of Florida adopted without discussion a negligence standard
155. Id. at 700.
156. 359 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d DCA), appeal dismissed, 365 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1978).
157. In Karp, the parties agreed with the trial judge's determination that the Gertz neg-
ligence standard should apply to private individuals. 359 So. 2d at 581.
158. 303 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
159. Id. at 651.
160. Id.




for private plaintiffs in defamation actions.1 63 Time Magazine pub-
lished as part of its "Milestones" column an article detailing the
divorce proceedings of Russell and Mary Firestone. 4 The article
falsely stated that the Firestone divorce was granted on grounds of
"adultery" when the actual basis for dissolution was "extreme cru-
elty."' 66 Mary Firestone, the divorced wife, sued the publisher of
Time for libel. The district court concluded that because Russell
Firestone was heir to the "immense Firestone rubber fortune" and
the divorce proceeding had generated sensational nationwide pub-
licity, the publication in Time related to a matter of public interest
or general concern and was constitutionally protected under the
Rosenbloom decision then in effect.16 6 The Supreme Court of Flor-
ida reversed the decision of the district court, finding that the
Times' article did not relate to a matter of public interest, as de-
fined by the United States Supreme Court in Rosenbloom. ' On
appeal, after remand to the district court, the Supreme Court of
Florida once again considered the case, 6 8 this time in the wake of
the United States Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on
the subject of private individuals in Gertz. The Florida Supreme
Court, while appearing to revert to the common law principle of
strict liability, cited with approval the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Gertz, noting the "convincing evidence of...
negligence" on the part of Time magazine.16 9 The court stated that
a careful examination of the Firestone divorce decree would have
revealed that "adultery" was not a basis for the dissolution.17 0 The
court described the actions of Time as a "flagrant example of 'jour-
nalistic negligence,' ,171 implying that no higher standard was re-
quired for private plaintiffs.
The United States Supreme Court remanded the case to the Su-
preme Court of Florida for failing to apply, at a minimum, a negli-
gence standard as established in Gertz.17 2 Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the majority, noted that the Florida Supreme Court,
163. Id. at 178.
164. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 746 (Fla. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 305
So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974) (per curiam), vacated, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
165. Id.
166. 254 So. 2d 386, 388-89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
167. 271 So. 2d at 752.
168. 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), vacated, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
169. Id. at 178.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 464 (1976).
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through its use of the term "negligence" to describe the degree of
care exercised by Time, had apparently adopted the negligence
standard for private individuals as articulated in Gertz. 13 The
Court nevertheless concluded that the Supreme Court of Florida
had not expressly shown a finding of fault on the part of Time by
the lower court and that a remand was warranted. 17' Justice Pow-
ell, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred and based his discussion
on the assumption that the Supreme Court of Florida would apply
a negligence standard to private plaintiffs. 17 5 Justice White dis-
sented because in his view the Supreme Court of Florida had in-
deed made a "sufficiently 'conscious determination'" of negligence
on behalf of Time,17 and he would therefore affirm the decision of
the Florida Supreme Court on the basis of Gertz.177
On remand, the Supreme Court of Florida directed the Fourth
District Court of Appeal to vacate the trial court's decision "for
further proceedings in the trial court not inconsistent with the de-
cision by the Supreme Court of the United States in this mat-
ter." 7 8 Therefore, the most recent pronouncement by the Florida
Supreme Court on the appropriate standard of liability to be es-
tablished by private plaintiffs, adopted without discussion the neg-
ligence standard of Gertz.
Recent Florida decisions have removed any doubt which may
have previously existed concerning the appropriate standard for
private plaintiffs under Florida defamation law. In Miami Herald
Publishing Company v. Ane, 79 the Third District Court of Appeal
held that under Florida law, private plaintiffs need only show that
a defamatory falsehood was published with negligence, in order to
recover compensatory damages. 8 ' In Ane, the media defendant
was held liable for statements contained in a newspaper article
which falsely implicated the private plaintiff in a seizure of illegal
drugs on the basis that the article was published with negligence.
Aurelio Ane, a beer distributor in Key West, Florida, was generally
reputed to be an honest man. 8' On November 21, 1977, a beer
truck containing three tons of marijuana was seized outside of
173. Id. at 463.
174. Id. at 464.
175. Id. at 464-65.
176. Id. at 484.
177. Id.
178. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 332 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 1976).
179. 423 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
180. Id. at 378.
181. Id. at 379.
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Marathon, Florida, by deputies of the Monroe County Sheriff's of-
fice. Greg Kirstein, a reporter for the defendant Miami Herald,
was assigned to cover the event from his local office in Key West.
Kirstein discovered from officials of the Monroe County Sheriff's
office that the licensed owner of the seized beer truck was Lillian
Fernandez. A subsequent check with the Florida Department of
Motor Vehicles confirmed this information. Upon further investi-
gation, Kirstein was able to locate the previous owner of the seized
beer truck and the company to which the owner had leased the
truck, Universal Brands. The president of Universal Brands, Mar-
vin Kimmel, told Kirstein in a telephone conversation that Univer-
sal Brands no longer leased the truck and that the previous owner
had told Kimmel that the truck had been sold prior to the seizure
to the plaintiff, Aurelio Ane.
Kirstein admittedly made no effort to determine the accuracy of
this "hearsay information. '" 182 No other source connected Ane with
the subject beer truck. Moreover, the Monroe County Sheriff's of-
fice had "specifically told" Kirstein that Ane was not "a suspect in
the case." '83
On November 22, 1977, an article by Kirstein based largely on
"unverified and contradicted hearsay ' 84 appeared in the local sec-
tion of the Miami Herald. This publication caused Ane personal
shame, humiliation and "considerable mental anguish." 8 The ar-
ticle read as follows:
"TRUCK ADVERTISED BEER: CARRIED MARIJUANA BALES"
An 'Old Milwaukee' beer truck, sold only last Thursday by a
Miami firm to a Key West distributor, was confiscated early
Monday carrying about three tons of baled marijuana on U.S. 1
in Marathon, Monroe County Sheriff's officials said.
The driver of the truck, 40-year-old William W. Horton, Slip
22, Tropical Marina, Key West, was charged with possession of
more than 100 pounds of marijuana and an invalid driver's li-
cense. He was being held on $150,000 bond at the sheriff's Mara-
thon sub-station late Monday.
Sheriff's officials promised 'a full-scale investigation' and said
they have 'several other suspects' in the case. THE LARGE red-
and-white truck, which Monday contained bales either wrapped
in burlap or packaged in cartons from Columbia, had been pur-
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 380.
185. Id. at 380, 390.
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chased Thursday by Aurelio Ane, Key West Distributors Inc.
president, according to Marvin Kimmel, president of Miami's
Universal Brands Inc.'186
Ane sued the Miami Herald and Greg Kirstein for libel on the
basis that the false statements contained in the article which re-
ferred to Ane as the owner of the confiscated beer truck were de-
famatory. The trial court instructed the jury that Ane could re-
cover if he established that the Miami Herald had been negligent
in publishing the false and defamatory article. 87 The jury returned
a verdict for Ane and the Miami Herald appealed.'88
Citing "a clear case of journalistic negligence,"' 89 the third dis-
trict affirmed the trial court's decision. The court rejected the
Miami Herald's contention that Florida law requires a private
plaintiff to show that the defamatory statements were published
with "actual malice" when the publication relates to a matter of
public interest or concern. 90 The court stated that "in accord with
established First Amendment law and the overwhelming weight of
authority throughout the country," Florida law requires a plaintiff
who is neither a public official nor a public figure to establish only
that the defamatory falsehood was published with negligence.'
The court held that this standard applies even to those private in-
dividuals who are injured by defamatory publications relating to
matters of public interest or general concern. 192
In reaching its decision, the Ane court noted that prior to the
United States Supreme Court decision in New York Times, Florida
defamation law was governed by common law defamation princi-
ples. 93 The court emphasized that under the common law system
which subjected a media defendant to strict liability absent the af-
firmative defenses of truth or privilege, Florida law "never re-
quired proof that the defendant acted negligently .. .much less
that the defendant acted with New York Times 'actual malice.' "e194
Stating that all of Florida's common law of defamation "has been
186. Id. at 379-80 (emphasis added in original).
187. Id. at 381-82.
188. Id. at 382.
189. Id. at 390.
190. Id. at 382.
191. Id. at 378.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 383.
194. Id.
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changed," '95 the court concluded that private plaintiffs in Florida,
and in the majority of jurisdictions, are required to establish that
false and defamatory statements were published with negligence.196
This standard, the court continued, is not a prerequisite "of the
Florida common law of defamation or Florida constitutional law"
but rather is a prerequisite "of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution which heretofore did not exist under Florida
law. Florida courts, in turn have consistently sought to follow these
federal standards in defamatory actions in the post-New York
Times era.' 91 7
The court observed that Florida courts had initially adhered to
the reformulation of the New York Times rule as announced in
Rosenbloom, which suggested that private individuals must show
actual malice when defamed by a publication relating to a matter
of public interest or concern. 198 However, when that decision was
repudiated in Gertz, Florida courts ceased to follow Rosenbloom
and instead applied the Gertz negligence standard to private plain-
tiffs.' 99 The Miami Herald conceded that Rosenbloom was no
longer good law at the federal level.200 The Herald contended, how-
ever, that Florida had adopted as a matter of state law the actual
malice standard for private individuals as a result of the Florida
Supreme Court's first decision in Firestone v. Time, Inc. 01 The
third district rejected this analysis stating that the Firestone deci-
sion, "purely and simply, interprets the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution in the context of a libel action and does
not even mention, much less interpret" the Florida Constitition.10 2
The court emphasized that because Firestone is "solely a First
Amendment case" applying the Rosenbloom standard, "it no
longer represents the law in view of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ''20 3
The court stated that when Rosenbloom "died at the federal level,
it died in the Florida courts as well."' 20 ' Moreover, the court noted
195. Id.
196. Id. at 378.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972)).
199. Id. (citing Karp v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 359 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d DCA),
dismissed, 365 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1978)). See also Helton v. United Press Int'l, 303 So. 2d 650
(Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
200. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 384.
201. 271 So. 2d 745.
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that the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in the
Firestone case adopted, without discussion, a negligence standard
for private individuals. °0
The court next rejected the Miami Herald's additional reliance
on the early conditional privilege cases stating that none of them
can be read "to adopt as a matter of state law" the Rosenbloom
standard of actual malice for private individuals. 20 6 To accept this
construction of Florida law, the court stated, would mean standing
Florida defamation law "on its head. '20 7
The law of defamation is designed to advance society's legiti-
mate interest in protecting individual reputations by providing re-
dress to one whose reputation has been damaged by false and de-
famatory publications. Because a system under which all
defamatory publications subject a media defendant to strict liabil-
ity would deter the dissemination of necessary information, defa-
mation law seeks to ameliorate the intolerable result of press cen-
sorship by granting media defendants protection from liability
without fault. Defamation law thus achieves its goal by balancing
the desire to be free from false and defamatory publications
against society's commitment to free and open discussion on mat-
ters of public significance.
The adoption of an actual malice standard for private individu-
als involved in matters of public interest would seriously erode the
ability of a private individual to obtain redress for injury to repu-
tation and would create an imbalance between reputational inter-
ests and the freedom of speech and press. The Gertz Court
stressed the inappropriateness of the Rosenbloom test of "matter
of general or public concern" because it ill served the competing
values at stake. The Court recognized the inconsistency and confu-
sion inherent in the determination of what constitutes a matter of
public interest or concern. Virtually every item that appears in to-
day's news can arguably be said to constitute a matter of public
interest or concern. 08 Because the parameters of public interest
are ill-defined, judges in defamation actions involving private
plaintiffs would be forced to make ad hoc decisions, on the issue
whether a certain publication relates to a matter of public interest.
Florida has not developed a workable test for determining matters
of public interest or concern and therefore the results of defama-
205. Id. at 383-84.
206. Id. at 385.
207. Id.
208. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 357 n. 4 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
DEFAMATION LAW
tion actions involving private plaintiffs would be inconsistent.2 09
Moreover, to subject a private plaintiff to the rigorous burden of
proving actual malice in an area as broad and undefined as public
interest, would effectively deny redress to a private individual who
has not consented to media exposure. As the Court noted in Gertz,
the defamation action represents perhaps the sole remedy availa-
ble to a private individual whose reputation has been involuntarily
subjected to injury by media intrusion. Private individuals do not
enjoy sufficient access to the means of communication necessary to
effectively rebut and correct attacks on their reputation. Further,
private individuals do not seek out media attention. Consequently,
the states' interest in protecting the reputational interests of the
private individual is greater than its interest in protecting public
officials or public figures. The negligence standard for private
plaintiffs recognizes this strong and pervasive interest and restores
the necessary balance between society's commitment to uninhib-
ited and robust discussions on public issues and reputational
interests.
The privilege to comment on matters of public interest was de-
veloped at common law to mitigate the harsh common law stan-
dard of strict liability. The negligence standard serves this original
purpose and Florida post-Gertz defamation decisions have not re-
lied on the public interest privilege to determine the appropriate
standard for private plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court which estab-
lished the existing federal constitutional standards for plaintiffs in
defamation actions, displaced common law defamation principles.
The Court determined that the degree of protection to be accorded
a media defendant was determined by focusing on the character or
status of the defamed plaintiff. This approach, which ignores the
subject matter of the publication itself, repudiated the actual mal-
ice requirement for private plaintiffs involved in a matter of public
209. In Firestone, the Florida Supreme Court, relying on Rosenbloom, struggled to de-
termine whether the Firestone divorce was a matter of public concern. The court concluded
by setting forth a plethora of situations covering almost every aspect of human existence,
which would constitute a matter of public concern. The court stated that "matters of real
public or general concern are those which invoke common and predominant public activity,
participation or indulgence, and cogitation, study and debate; and they include such matters
relating generally to the health, well-being and general comfort of the public as a whole."
Id. at 749.
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interest, establishing instead a negligence standard for private in-
dividuals. Moreover, the court refused to incorporate into its defi-
nition of malice the common law requirement of ill will or inten-
tion to defame.
Florida courts have consistently followed those standards articu-
lated by the United States Supreme Court in determining the ap-
propriate standard of liability to be established by private individ-
uals in defamation actions. By adopting the negligence standard
announced in Gertz, Florida courts essentially have renounced all
pre-Gertz defamation decisions involving private plaintiffs and
have logically removed the conditional privilege to comment on
matters of public interest involving private individuals.
The free speech and press guaranteed by the first amendment is
an absolute precondition to a free and open society. If divorced
from its original purpose, intolerable censorship would result.
However, the first amendment was not intended to allow the press
its own jurisprudence. Florida defamation law seeks to extract a
sense of responsibility in exchange for the freedoms of the press.
By following the negligence standard for private individuals estab-
lished in Gertz, Florida courts have recognized the important value
society places on the reputational interests of the private individ-
ual. Any attempt to remove this important interest by adopting an
actual malice standard for private individuals, would give the press
a protection not intended by the first amendment and would im-
pair to an appreciable extent the underlying social values of the
defamation action in modern society.
The Florida Supreme Court may soon have the opportunity to
specifically delineate the standard of liability to be established by
private plaintiffs in defamation actions.21 While the legal commu-
nity continues to debate the issues surrounding this area, one can
be assured that the court, following a review of Florida defamation
law and its own decisions concerning private plaintiffs, will be
most receptive to a standard of liability less than "actual malice."
210. As this writing, the Florida Supreme Court has recently called for briefs on the
merits in the case of Miami Herald Pulishing Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982),
which held that Florida defamation law requires a private plaintiff to establish publication
with negligence. See supra text accompanying note 191.
